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Introduction
There always has been a special connection between the labour and civil law 
regulation,1 at least since we can speak about independent labour law mate­
rial, or labour law as an independent legal sphere.2 Though the independence 
of the regulation can be questioned in the Hungarian legal system, too, it is 
indisputable that the two legal fields cannot be regarded united, without any 
differentiation, and the main reason of it is the different type of the regulated 
legal relationships. Namely, nowadays the employment relationship -  besides 
its unquestionable civil law-type and its growing flexibility3 -  is characteristic 
of the special status, the hierarchic structure which is also characteristic of the 
classical labour relationships, that is the employer’s power over the employ­
ee, and its consequence, her/his surplus rights. Therefore, the fundamental 
characteristics of the content of the legal relationship cannot be overlapped 
w ith the classical civil law, namely civil law legal relations, since they are in 
coordinate relation, not in superior.4 This significant difference justifies the 
existence of the independent regulation and legal practice anyway.
In spite of this it cannot be questioned that the inner logic of the labour 
relationships, and several elements of the legal relationship -  m ainly the em­
ployment contract and its several aspects -  do not differ from the civil law,
1 G. Kenderes, A munkajogi esp o lgd r i j o g i  szabdlyozds viszonydnak egyes alapkerdesei, Jogtudomanyi
Kozlony 2001, Vol. 56, No. 3, p. 113—120.
2 J. Radnay, M unkajog, Budapest 2009, p. 29—40.
3 G. Kiss, Uj foglalkoztatdsi módszerek a  munkajog hatdrdn — az atipikus foglalkoztatdstól a  sze-
rzodesi tipusvdlasztdsi kenyszer versus tipusvdlasztdsi szabadsdg problem atikdjd ig , Magyar Jog
2007, Vol. 54, No. 1, p. 1-14.
4 G. Kiss, M unkajog, Budapest 2005, p. 93-94.
72 PETER SIPKA, MARTON LEO ZACCARIA
namely, we can come to the conclusion that though, regarding the subjects 
and objects5 of the legal relation the nature of the legal relationships are defi­
nitely different, several legal institutions can be named which regulation in 
fact can be thought of as parallel -  even with minimal differences -  referring 
to the labour and civil law legal regulation material. It is true in spite of the 
fact that it could have been impossible in a form declared in law before the 
Hungarian labour law reform started in 2012, even if  judicial intentions like 
this were clear earlier.6
Most of the norms declared in the general conduct requirements (fun­
damental principles),7 the establishment of a contract, legal statements, the 
statute of lim itations, invalidity, some aspects of termination of the legal re­
lationship, the application of the services, the compensation law what is the 
theme of this essay/study, both its financial and non-financial forms can be 
regarded as such institutions. Regarding the questions regulated with slight 
differences but by the same intellectuality and referring to the „relationship” 
with long history between the civil and labour law,8 the Act I of 2012 Act on 
the Labour Code has made significant progress, since the legislator made the 
Act IV of 1959 Act on the Civil Code and the Act V  of 2013 Act on the Civil 
Code coming into force on 15th March of 2014 background law, namely, in 
several questions in the lack of Labour Code, the rules of C ivil Code must 
be applied, this way assisting labour legal application by civil law rules.9 So 
it is necessary to examine how certain regulations of the new Civil Code 
coming into force soon influences the Labour Code referring to the fact that 
the Civil Code itself contains new rules, too, so certain questions cannot be 
regarded as the „continuation” of the earlier civil law antecedents, but rather
5 Work performed for remuneration.
6 T. Prugberger, Eurdpai es m agyar osszehasonlito munka- es kozszolgdlati jo g , Budapest 2006,
p. 43-48.
7 Typically, they are of legal origin, so the general expectable clause, the prohibition of the abuse
of rights, the requirement of good faith, the obligation of co-operation and information, the 
protection of personal rights, or even the new rule according to which the basis of the Civil 
Code declares that nobody can refer to malfeasance conduct with the aim of advantages (6. § 
paragraph (1) 2. turn) or the allusive conduct-type rule (6. § paragraph (2) 2. turn). Besides, 
several basic principles are characteristic of the Hungarian labour law -  the requirement of 
equal treatment, the protection of the employer’ rightful economic interest, the obligation of 
confidentiality, the right to control — which aren’t relevant to the fundamental principles of 
civil law, but it is clear that most of the requirements and the theoretical basis of the general 
behavioural requirements come from civil law.
8 J. Radnay, A munkaszerzodes es a  munkaviszony egyes kerdesei, Gazdasag es Jog 2006, Vol. 14,
No. 9, p. 19-21.
9 Besides, it cannot disregard that the background law-type of the Civil Code will result general
attitude change in long-term, but its refinement and modification will result changes soon 
expectedly.
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they reflect new views, so they require new approach from both the legislative 
and judicial part, and also from the part of the legal science. This change has 
effects on the remedy law at several points, too, but the most important is the 
institution of the grievance fee which has only indirect connection with the 
legal remedy what needs to be analysed anyway, mainly because the legisla­
tor disposes of it in accordance with the 9. § (1) of the T/12824. bill not in 
the circle of the liab ility for damages, but in connection with the personal 
rights, and this way the rule of the Labour Code referring to the Civil Code 
also changes and this raises both dogmatical and practical questions at the 
same time.
So this way the special relationship between the Labour Code and the 
Civil Code can be described as it follows. The system of employment law 
is completed by the norms of civil law, exactly the general requirements of 
contract law. O f course, not all the rules of civil law can be applied for em­
ployment relationships, but the ideas and most of the requirements in con­
nection with the solution of the contracts are used in labour law as well. 
In concluding the questions and problems of liab ility for damages and the 
grievance fee is connected with special legal framework of these two different 
fields of Hungarian law.
The dogmatics and development o f non-pecuniary damages 
in Hungarian civil law
Non-pecuniary damage has been present in civil law regulations since the 
19th century.10 At the turn of the century, Beni Grosschmid claims that “As 
a regulation, obligation for damages only includes compensation for pecuni­
ary damage. Thus, the opposite has to be understood as exceptions of narrow­
er or wider scope, departing from the general argument.”11 In comparison, 
Karoly Szladits states:
The pain resulting from bodily harm, the grievance of honour, artistic 
or business reputation, etc. cannot be expressed by pecuniary decrease: 
that is, the cases o f ethical or personal damage [...] in such cases the ag­
grieved party receives compensation for the damage, and so it becomes 
easier for them to bear with it. This is the so called non-pecuniary (or 
ethical) damage.12
10 T. Fezer, A nem  vagyon i kdrterites kerdesei a hazai jogalkalmazdsban , Miskolc 2003, p. 113.
11 B. Grosschmid, Fejezetek kötelm i jo gu nk  k örebolI, Budapest 1901, p. 765.
12 K. Szladits, A m agyar m agan jog vazlata II. resz, Budapest 1933, p. 73.
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Geza Marton delinieates two forms of civil law sanctions: first, the so- 
called “restitutive” sanction, which serves the purpose of restitution, while 
the essential function of the second one, “repressive” sanction can be grasped 
by its punitive nature.13 According to Tamas Labady’s standpoint, non-pecu- 
niary damage specifically presupposes an obligation based on personal dam­
age, and it is consequently inseparable from personality rights.14 At the same 
time, however, we also need to realize that -  again, quoting the words of 
Labady -  non-pecuniary damage is a “contradiction in terms,” and we can 
only dispose of its contradictions by legal fiction.15 Fiction means that the 
law balances certain damage and the value of this is approximately equal with 
that of an advantage of another k ind .16 The same is articulated by Ferenc 
Petrik, who poses the following question: “And can we talk about damage at 
all?”17 If we examine this institution from a functional aspect, Labady writes, 
and then its purpose is the compensation for a personal damage, in which the 
solidarity of the state is expressed for the aggrieved party, and also, its repa­
ration against the party at fault.18 The viewpoint of Peter Bardos somewhat 
contradicts this, since he argues that the purpose of non-pecuniary damages 
can neither be reparation nor compensation, but it is exclusively a kind of 
proportional restitution by means of the law, the subject of which can only 
be a natural person.19
The first comprehensive regulation of liability for non-pecuniary damage 
is to be found in clause XIV of 1914, in the M edia Act, which permitted the 
adjustment of financial compensation for damages caused by a press release 
not only for pecuniary damage but for non-pecuniary damage as well. Ac­
cording to 39. § of the act, “the aggrieved party can claim damages for a pe­
cuniary damage caused by a press release and for a non-pecuniary damage as 
well if  it is (with regard to the circumstances of the case) equitable.” Accord­
ing to the legislation, the courts state the amount of the compensation for 
the non-pecuniary damage considering all the circumstances, especially the 
financial situation of the two parties.
13 G. Marton, A polgdrij o g i  fe lelosseg , Budapest 1992, p. 24.
14 T. Labady, A nem  va gyon i kdrterites ü jabb b iró i gyakorlata , Budapest 1992, p. 30.
15 Ibidem , p. 31.
16 Ib id em , p. 33.
17 Quoted by: Z. Lomniczi, B.L. Gazsó, A nem  vagyon i kdrteritessel kapcsolatos perek  legü jabb  
tendencid i, Budapest 2011, p. 7.
18 G. Marton, K drteritesi kötelmek jo ge llen es  magatartdsból IV. 782, quoted by: T. Labady, A nem  
va gyon i kdrterites..., p. 32.
19 T. Pataky, A nem  va gyon i kdrterites szabdlyozdsa es b iró i gyakorlata — Beszdmoló a  M agyar Jogdsz- 
egyletB iz tositdsjogi Szekciója 2008. jü n iu s  6-dn tarto tt üleserol, Biztosftasi Szemle 2008, Vol. 54, 
No. 5, p. 9-13.
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Clause XLI of 1914 on the protection of honour is closely connected to 
this, since it extends protection to behaviours expressed not via the press, too. 
The legislation remained consistent in further relevant regulations (Authorial 
Act, 1921, clause LIV; 1923, clause V  on unfair competition), which also 
knew the notion on non-pecuniary damages. According to 1114. § of the 
1928 Civil Code bill, whoever commits a forbidden action or misprision ei­
ther intentionally or because of gross negligence, and is bound to pay a com­
pensation, also has to provide a financial restitution for the non-pecuniary 
damage of the aggrieved party -  if, considering all the circumstances of the 
case, equity necessitates it.
The historical development of non-pecuniary damage recoiled as a result 
of the Supreme Court’s principal decision III of 1953, which annihilated the 
institution of non-pecuniary damages by claim ing that amidst socialist living 
conditions, ethical values cannot be expressed in money. The legal practice 
tried to compensate for this obviously inequitable situation with the extend­
ed interpretation of the so-called “general compensation”.20 This unclarified 
legal environment was finally settled by the 354. § of the law IV of 1977, 
which placed the regulations on non-pecuniary damages within the Civil 
Code. This was supplemented by the 16th directive of the Supreme Court, 
which focussed prim arily on bodily harm, and injuries causing health dam­
age, somewhat passing over the protection of personality rights. The directive 
was overruled by the 21st directive of the Supreme Court, wishing to provide 
an opportunity to establish a judicial practice examining “the overall protec­
tion of personality and ethical values”.
A certain view has evolved in the legal literature on which this is based, 
namely, that in the course on adjusting non-pecuniary damages the regula­
tions of liab ility in the Civil Code have to prevail,21 so when stating liability 
for non-pecuniary damages, four conditions have to appear according to Civ­
il Code regulations: the supervening of the damage, malfeasance, culpability 
and causative connection.22 However, while in the case of pecuniary damage 
the act of malfeasance (if the legislation does not make an exception) stems 
from causing damage,23 in the case of non-pecuniary damage, from the dam­
age itself no malfeasance can be inferred.24 In the case of non-pecuniary com­
20 I. Kertesz, Vagyoni kärpötläs n em  va gyon i kärert, Jogtudomanyi Közlöny 1958, Vol. 13, 
No. 3-4 , p. 89-95.
21 K. Töro, Szem elyisegvedelem  a p o lgä r i jo gb an , Budapest 1979, p. 141.
22 F. Petrik, A szem elyisegi j o g  vedelm e, A sajtö-helyreigazitäs, Budapest 2001, p. 201.
23 G. Eörsi, A polgä r i j o g i  kärteritesi fe lelö sseg  kezikönyve, Budapest 1966, p. 108.
24 F. Petrik, Nem vagyon i kärpötläs: a  szem elyisegvedelem  ältalänos es fe lte t len  eszköze, Magyar Jog 
1991, Vol. 39, No. 6, p. 337-343.
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pensation the basis of malfeasance is that “the law places under its protection 
the personal rights of the person as well -  beside their pecuniary rights -  and 
obliges everyone to respect personal rights.”25 Consequently, quoting Ferenc 
Petrik, “only such behaviours lead to a claim for non-pecuniary compensa­
tion which are against the law, that is, which violate personal rights”.26
The most throughout influence on the legal practice was the 34/1992. 
(VI. 1.) Constitutional Court (in the following: CC) ruling, which basically 
annihilated all previous legal regulations and in its justification has created 
the modern basis of non-pecuniary compensation.27 The C C ’s court ruling in 
its mandatory section has stated that the following passage of the Civil Code, 
1959, clause IV, 354. § is unconstitutional: “...if  the damage hinders the ag­
grieved party’s participation in social life or seriously encumbers their life, or 
is disadvantageous for the legal entity in its participation in economic circu­
lation”, and annihilated it. As a result of the partial annihilation, the 354. 
§ remained operative with the following text: “The causer of the damage is 
bound to compensate for the non-pecuniary damage of the aggrieved party.” 
Furthermore, the C C  stated that the following passage of the Labour Code, 
1992, Act XXII, 177. § (2) paragraph, “ the participation of the employee in 
social life or everyday life, as a result of the damage, became enduringly and 
seriously hindered” is unconstitutional, and thus annihilated it. As a result 
of the partial annihilation, the 177. § (2) paragraph of the Act was put into 
force with the following text: “The worker’s non-pecuniary damages also have 
to be compensated for.”
In the justification of the regulation, the C C  stated that the institution 
of non-pecuniary compensation is a legal device within the Civil Code for 
cases of personal tort. Thus, in the interpretation of the CC , the condition 
of a claim for non-pecuniary compensation is the personality right tort.28 
Besides, the regulation also includes that it has identified the kinds of non- 
pecuniary compensation according to the previous regulations on the conse­
quences of the violation of law, that is, it only protected the personal rights 
depending on the effect of the violation of the law, and lim ited the non- 
pecuniary compensation to more serious cases which resulted in an arbitrary
stipulation. A crucial point of the decision is the statement that the amount
of the damages and the damage itself suffered by the person are both based 
on approximation, which do not have any objective benchmark, and thus it 
cannot be constitutionally suited to the consequences within the legislation.
25 F. Petrik, A torvenyszerkeszto d ilem m di Ш, Magyar Jog 1978, Vol. 25, No. 3, p. 221-237.
26 F. Petrik, Nem vagyon i kdrpotlds..., p. 337-343.
27 T. Fezer, A nem  va gyon i kdrterites kerdesei..., p. 113.
28 T. Fezer, A nem  va gyon i kdrterites kerdesei..., p. 112.
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In such cases only the personal devotion, the common sense and the temper­
ance of the courts can have a decisive role.29 The legal institution within the 
right for compensation -  according to the standpoint of C C  -  cannot be 
utilized, since in such cases there is no pecuniary damage and thus we cannot 
talk about a „full” or „not full” compensation. Either the basis of the tort is 
thus not the damage itself but the damage of the person.
On the whole we can argue that in our operative jurisdiction the 1992 
C C  regulation has assigned those legal frameworks where the practice on 
non-pecuniary practice are precedential. Also, from the regulations of the 
Civil Code it can be stated that the non-pecuniary compensation within civil 
law is not a separate form of liability,30 but a liab ility figure connected to the 
damage of personal rights in which the violation of the law stands in the tort 
of a law connected to the person.31
From among these conditions, it is obviously the notion of damage that 
needs to be examined in connection with non-pecuniary compensation. The 
literature on civil law in this question has applied various approaches, exam­
ining the issue from the following aspects: the occurrence of non-pecuniary 
damage usually is observable in three areas: the damage of health or body, an 
attack against other personality rights and as the effect of a faulty influence 
on the participation in the economic circulation.32 Actual physical injury 
includes injuries in accidents, aesthetic harm in connection with this, the 
change in the quality of life, losing certain social or everyday pleasures as well. 
Here the labour regulations do not raise any special problem, since in con­
nection with such damages, the full and objective liability of the employer 
and its full obligation for compensation prevail.
W ith  relevance to personal rights, the scope of damaging behaviours is 
wide; anything belongs to it which results in personality rights tort, and the 
damage caused by this. On the basis of the judgments to be presented later, it 
is already arguable that in connection with this group of cases the practice of 
labour jurisdiction follows an extended interpretation. Into the third group 
belong those cases where the damage influences participation in the econom­
ic circulation. The actions pertaining to this issue are interesting because ac­
cording to certain authors, the aggrieved party in such a case cannot only be 
a natural person, but a legal entity as well participating in economic law.33
29 E. Talne Molnar, A munkdltato kdrteritesi felelossege, Budapest 2009, p. 259-297.
30 K. Toro, A nem  vagyon i kdrterites gyakorlati kerdesei, Magyar Jog 1992, Vol. 39, No. 8, p. 449- 
^ 5 4 .
31 B.F., A nem  vagyon i kdr m egteritese, Cegvezetes 2007, Vol. 16, No. 1, p. 131-134.
32 O. Zoltan, A nem  va gyon i kdr m egtenteserol, Magyar Jog 1991, Vol. 31, No. 9, p. 529-533.
33 Ibidem , p. 529-533.
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Judicial practice understands by non-pecuniary damage or drawback the 
aggrieved party’s social exclusion, the negative change of the human person­
ality and their mental-emotional quality of life.34 In connection with this it 
has to be examined to what extent the given (sued) behaviours resulted for 
the aggrieved party the emergence of a negative value judgment, and to what 
extent it modified their social position.35
From among the four above mentioned damage elements the proving of 
the violation of law and culpability do not mean any problem, however, the 
notion of non-pecuniary drawback and in connection with causal connection 
we can find differing opinions,36 where the courts in several cases -  somewhat 
opposing the spirit of the C C  ruling -  have emphasised the institution as 
a compensation. The Supreme Court has previously stated that the pecuniary 
nature of the claim for compensation is not altered by whether its putting 
into force is based on the personality rights tort;37 however, in itself as a con­
dition of the compensation it is not sufficient that it is a personality rights 
tort but it is also needed that in connection with the violation of the law, its 
consequences the aggrieved party suffered some disadvantaged situation.38 
Thus, it means that even though in the light of the C C  ruling it is theoretical­
ly  sufficient that the aggrieved party can prove the fact of aggrievement, still, 
the court in addition requested the proving of some concrete disadvantage. 
From this the judge can only divert if  the disadvantage is publicly known.39
By publicly known facts judicial practice means such facts that are actu­
ally referential in any case of any tort, that is, if  the violation of the law was 
proven, then, as a publicly known fact, it is acceptable that the aggrieved 
party did not suffer a pecuniary damage, which can be compensated for with 
a non-pecuniary restitution.40 The practice crystallized by the end of 2000 
and according to this the non-pecuniary compensation can be requested if 
they can prove that the violation of the law is causally connected to some 
disadvantage, to the lessening of which or its elim ination the adjusting of 
non-pecuniary compensation is reasonable.41
34 T. Kiss, Nem vagyon i kdrterites va gy s e r e lem d j, Jogtudomanyi Kozlony 2007, Vol. 62, No. 4, 
p. 164-172.
35 P. Havasi, A nem  va gyon i kdr b irdsdgigyakorlat, Gazdasag es Jog 2002, Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 11-14.
36 T. Kiss, Nem vagyon i kdrterites..., p. 164-172.
37 BH 1991.476, Curia of Hungary.
38 PfV. 20895/2000/3, Curia of Hungary.
39 K. Horeczky, A nem  va gyon i kdrterites jo g in tezm enye , Gazdasag es Jog 1996, Vol. 4, No. 2, 
p. 13-16.
40 T. Kiss, Nem vagyon i kdrterites..., p. 164-172.
41 See for example: PfV. IV.20.895/2000, PfV.22.955/1994, PfV.III.20.403/1995, Curia of Hun­
gary.
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In the course of the recodification of the Civil Code it emerged that the 
institution of the non-pecuniary compensation should be revised, as it had 
been urged by the judicial practice42 and the necessity to renew the contents 
of this legal institution also appeared.43 As a result, the new Civil Code re­
formed the legal institution, and placed the regulation in the second volume 
(The Person as a Legal Subject), among the sanctions for the tort concerning 
personal rights. The law articulates the general protection of personal rights44 
and in clause XII it details the sanctions of such a tort. The law knows the no­
tion of independent sanctions from culpability,45 in connection with which 
we can claim that the application of objective personal protection is indepen­
dent from the party at fault’s ability to violate the law and their culpability.46
Summing up the above we can see that non-pecuniary compensation with 
the putting into force of the new Civil Code was reregulated. The Labour 
Code at present does not contain the notion of compensation yet, but paral­
lel w ith the putting into force of the new Civil Code, there will be changes 
in the regulations and they will include it, in accordance with the new Civil 
Code.
The regulation o f compensation in the new Civil Code with 
reference to the features o f labour relations
The 2nd volume, clause XI of the new Civil Code contains the regulations of 
personal rights. Here, 2:42. § states the obligation for the general protection 
of personality rights, which is based on the principle that everybody is bound 
to respect personality rights.
2:43. § enumerates the personality rights. Based on this, the tort concern­
ing personality rights especially includes
a) life tort, bodily harm or health damage;
b) personal liberty tort, privacy, or home;
c) discrimination;
d) honour or reputation tort;
e) privacy tort or the right to the protection of personal data;
42 See for example: T. Labady, A deliktudlis fe lelö sseg  vd ltozdsdröles ennek a p o lgd r i j o g i  kodifikdciöra 
gyakorolt hatdsdröl, Jura 2002, Vol. 8, No. 1, p. 72—78.
43 L. Vekas, S ere lem d j — F d jda lom d j: Gondolatok az ü j Ptk. reform javaslatdröl a  n em et j o g  ü jabb  
fe jlem en y e i tükreben, Magyar Jog 2005, Vol. 49, No. 4, p. 193—207.
44 2:42. § paragraph (2): Everyone is bound to respect human dignity and the personality rights 
originating from it. These personality rights are under the protection of the law.
45 2:41.§ [sanctions independent from culpability].
46 F. Petrik (ed.), Az ü j Ptk. magyardzata I/VI, Budapest 2013, p. 160.
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f) the right to bear their own names;
g) the right to have an image or audio recording.
The items listed in point a) are in the focus of the present paper, however, 
theoretically it is not impossible that within the field of labour relations the 
other areas can be violated, too.
As opposed to the previous examples, the consequences of personality 
rights tort are different as well. Among these, one can differentiate between 
objective and subjective groups. 2:51. § enumerates the sanctions indepen­
dent from culpability, which result in a disadvantage based on the fact of the 
tort in itself, and thus it is not necessary to examine the consciousness of the 
person committing the tort. Among the options enumerated in paragraph (1) 
it is observable that most of these are not pecuniary sanctions, so if  the ag­
grieved party claims that the tort is based on this legislation, then according
to the overruling regulation in the judicial consequences it is not the pecuni­
ary nature of the case that would dominate.
The crucial legal institution connected to the present study is the compen­
sation as regulated in 2:52. §. According to the legislation, “whose personality 
rights are damaged, can claim compensation for the non-pecuniary damage they 
suffered”.47 Consequently, the condition of adjusting the compensation is the 
tort concerning personality rights (malfeasance) and non-pecuniary damage.48 
The second paragraph states that “to the conditions of obliging someone to pay 
a compensation -  especially the identification of the person bound to pay the 
compensation and the method of exculpation -  the regulations of compensation 
liability have to be applied and beyond the fact of the claim, there is no need to 
prove any other disadvantage that emerged.” As a result, the causal connection 
between the behaviour and the tort has to be proven as a further condition of li­
ability, as well as culpability itself (according to general culpability liability) or the 
regulations on the pursuers of especially dangerous activities.49
Based on 2:53. §, if  the tort concerning personality rights also leads to 
pecuniary damage, then the aggrieved party can also claim compensation for 
the damages based on the regulations of the liability for malfeasance.50
This is a major innovation in the law, since it breaks away from the previ­
ous judicial practice,51 i.e. the non-pecuniary compensation can be adjusted 
in total or in the form of supplies. The new Civil Code clearly articulates that
47 2:52. § paragraph (1).
48 F. Petrik (ed.), Az ü jPtk. magyardzata . . . ,  p. 164.
49 Ib id em , p. 165.
50 Ib id em , p. 167.
51 Directive no. 19, point 6, PEH 24-2, Curia of Hungary quoted by: F. Petrik (ed.), Az ü j Ptk.
m a gya rd z a ta ., p. 166.
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The amount of compensation is stated by the court in total, with regard 
to the circumstances of the case -  especially the weight of the malfea­
sance, its recidivious nature and the level of culpability, the effect o f the 
malfeasance on the aggrieved party and their environment.52
Based on the above, in the field of tort concerning personality rights, we 
can distinguish between three areas. The first one is tort resulting from bodily 
change (2:43. § based on point a)), which includes every such case where the 
aggrieved party suffers an in jury of their physical state, health, and some kind 
of decrease or deterioration occurs. The second one includes mental changes 
(2:43. § from points b) to g)), which means the “inner lesion” of the personal­
ity. The third group takes place in the relationship between the outside world 
and the aggrieved party, when the social acceptance of the aggrieved party, 
their social judgment might be affected. In the case of these latter changes it 
is unusual to claim non-pecuniary damages in labour court cases.
In connection with claims connected to labour relations our standpoint 
is that the most common case is tort resulting from bodily harm and to 
a m inimal level, though, but in sues for damages there are also examples 
where the employer committed malfeasant actions and the employees wished 
to vindicate the psychic consequences of the employer’s (real or imagined) 
malfeasant action in the form of non-pecuniary damage. In the past three 
years we can find six such judgments by the Curia of Hungary (formerly the 
Supreme Court).53
The question arises, whether with the appearance of compensation the 
sums adjusted in previous court cases as non-pecuniary damages would be 
points of reference for the future? The answer to this question is beyond the 
scope of this present study; however, we still find it important to share a few 
ideas on this issue.
Considering the legal nature of the compensation, it is a restitution, that 
is, amends for the non-pecuniary damage suffered by the aggrieved party.54 
As a result, the weight of the malfeasance its recidivious nature, its effects and 
other circumstances of the party at fault’s attitude define it. The legislator 
has left the concrete details of the procedure to the judicial practice. Having 
surveyed this,55 it seems constructive that the amounts of the adjusted sum 
will not change in the future, w ith regard to the fact that the judicial practice
52 2:52. § paragraph (3).
53 Mfv.I.10.880/2009/4, Mfv.I.10.282/2007/3, Mfv.II.10.714/2009/5, Mfv.I.10.283/2012/5, 
Mfv.I.10.871/2010/5, Mfv.II.10.990/2010/4, Curia of Hungary.
54 F. Petrik (ed.), Az u j Ptk. magyardzata.. p. 166.
55 E. Talne Molnar, A munkdltató kdrteritesi..., p. 259—297.
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so far has proceeded based on the life situation, the pecuniary and income 
conditions of the aggrieved party (and not rarely even the party at fault).
However, there is a major difference remaining after the modifications 
of the Labour Code. Based on 2:52. § (3) paragraph of the Civil Code, the 
court adjusts the compensation in total, considering all the circumstances of 
the case. As opposed to this, 173. § (1) of the Labour Code “As a compensa­
tion, supplies can also be adjusted. Usually supplies have to be adjusted if  the 
compensation serves the purpose of providing for or partly providing for the 
employee or a relative of the employee.” So it is clear that in the Labour Code 
the present judicial practice of the regulations is maintained in this field, 
while for employees it means a significant advantage.
According to the new regulations of the Labour Code, in the course of ad­
justing compensation the regulations of the Civil Code have to be followed. 
Thus, 2:53. § of the Civil Code will serve as precedent, which regulates the 
liab ility for compensation. According to the law, “whoever suffers damage as 
a result of the tort concerning their personality rights, can claim compensa­
tion for the damage caused by malfeasance from the party at fault, based on 
the regulations on liability.”
The protection o f personal rights in the Labour Code
Basically, these entitlements are both parties’ legal due during the labour re­
lationship, but -  because of the nature of the legal relationship -  in different 
ways. However, in the 9 § (1) of the Labour Code it is a fundamental prin­
ciple that the persons’ -  subject to law -  personal rights must be kept in re­
spect. It is very important because the personal rights -  which are as a matter 
of fact based on civil law -  belong to the persons’ most fundamental rights, 
by which one’s personal integrity realizes, and unfolds one’s personality. We 
can find its base in the unrestrictable fundamental human and constitutional 
right to human dignity.
The first group of these rules56 approaches the question from the em­
ployee’s part putting her/his legal protection to the fore and the general 
requirements can be deduced from them. According to it these rights can 
be restricted only if  the restriction is absolutely necessary because of a rea­
son in direct connection with the function of the employment relationship 
and it is proportioned with its purpose. However, the employee must be 
informed about its way, conditions and expected content in advance. On the 
one hand the law interprets the respect of personal rights rather free, since
56 9-10. § of the Labour Code.
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their infringement is allowed in an unproportionally wide sphere. W hat is 
more, contrary to the facts explicated above the literacy is not compulsory ac­
cording to the law, namely the employee’s personal right can be restricted in 
a form of a verbal instruction. In the Labour Code of 1992 (previous Labour 
Code) such concrete rules were not declared, but the governing legal practice 
in the last 20 years57 highlighted that this kind of legal practice is absolutely 
necessary. It is important that the employee cannot wave her/his rights of this 
kind generally in advance, and any kind of provisions is valid only in writing. 
These norms definitely serve the protection of the entitled employees’ per­
sonal rights, since they define the employer’s margin regarding this question.
It must be added that this kind of interpretation of these general rules -  
namely, the protection of the personal rights -  w ill be distinguished from the 
Labour Code when the new Civil Code comes into force and in its place ac­
cordingly the new 9. § (1) a regulation referring to the Civil Code will be put 
which though comprehensively, but allowing differences of the Labour Code, 
controls the protection of personal rights in the employment relationship.58
The second group of these rules59 is about the protection of the employee’s 
personal data. These rules had important role even in the Labour Code of 
1992. The employee can be asked to make only such report which is im ­
portant from the point of the labour relationship and does not infringe her/ 
his personal rights. The report of personal data to a third party is restricted, 
and it is also important that the employee cannot store or manage such data 
without restraint at her/his own discretion. Naturally, there are exceptions to 
the main rule that is the data processing for statistical purposes. Furthermore, 
these basic entitlements can be interpreted as the employer’s obligation of 
confidentiality. This way the legislator tries to balance this obligation with the 
extensive obligation of confidentiality imposed on the employer.
Finally, we would like to note the third group of personal rights60 which 
appears in the Labour Code in a special way. Practically, in this circle the 
Labour Code is about the employer’s right to intervention and control which 
importance is that this kind of actions set further lim its to the employer nec­
essarily. Naturally, they are compatible w ith the purpose of the employment 
relationship, since without the employer’s entitlement for control her/his in­
57 See for example: EBH2005. 1237, EBH2000. 359, EBH2000. 249, BH2001. 467, Curia of 
Hungary.
58 According to this rule in case the Labour Code does not order differently for the employee’s 
and the employer’s personal rights, 2:42-54. § of the new Civil Code must be applied referring 
to the fact that on application of the 2:52. §  paragraph (2) and (3) and 2:53 §  the rules of the 
Labour Code in connection with liability for damages must be applied.
59 10. § of the Labour Code.
60 9-10. § and in connection with it 8. § paragraph (2) of the Labour Code.
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struction right would not be relevant any longer, namely, practically it would 
not be possible to speak about employer’s right in its original meaning.61 The 
employee’s conduct can be controlled only in connection with her/his work 
what cannot — neither its means nor its methods — infringe her/his right to 
human dignity, and the control over her/his private life is totally forbidden. 
Some contradiction can be observed between this norm and the 8. § (2) of 
the Labour Code, since the possible restriction over the cases of conduct be­
yond the working time often coincides with the problematic question of the 
private life and free time control.62 So the controlling authority is restricted 
because control over these would infringe personal rights for sure. The inter­
pretation of the protection of the right to human dignity and private life as 
absolute lim it is noteworthy, because these rights being fundamental human 
rights must not be lim ited. However, in accordance with the function of the 
employment relationship the employee can be controlled anyway within the 
frames of the employment contract and the Labour Code The employer is 
also obliged to inform the employee in advance about the technical means by 
which she/he carries out checks -  e.g. the control in a room with camera -  so 
the law tries to prevent „interception”, secret surveillance which out coming 
could be the cause of termination or sanction later.
The appearance o f non-material infringe in labour law 
ju dgments
As we noted above in connection with the non-material infringement the 
34/1992. (VI. 1.) AB resolution removed the provisions of the Labour Code 
partly, so the only exposure remained in the law is that the employer is obliged 
to compensate the employee for the non-material infringement. So it can be 
stated that both civil and labour courts face the same problems, and at the 
latter the practice is modified because according to the Labour Code liability 
rules should be applied. But in our opinion it does not make great differ­
61 T. Gyulavari (ed.), M unkajog, Budapest 2012, p. 255-260.
62 According to 8. § paragraph (2) the employee beyond the working time cannot have such 
conduct which — on the basis of the type of her/his scope of duties, position in the employer’ 
organisation — directly and factually is proper for damaging the employer’s good faith, rightful 
economic interest or the aim of the labour relationship, this way the employee’s conduct can 
be restricted but only in such cases that were mentioned in connection with the protection 
of personal rights (9. § paragraph (2)) but about such restrictions the employee should be 
informed in writing in advance. It is noted that this rule is new in the Labour Code, but as 
a consequence of the employer’s broad instruct and control right in judicial practice this kind 
of interpretation has not been exclusive so far. It is interesting that the labour law regulation 
which turns into the direction of the equality of the parties is not perfectly compatible with 
this disproportionate and arbitrary restriction.
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ences, since in connection with the non-material compensation the most 
difficult point is the definition of the measure of the compensation during 
which the courts have to make decisions after due care.63
In connection with the labour judgments it is necessary to refer to the MK 
30. commitment which names the circle of infringements where to confirm 
the employer’s liability is of high importance. They are the employee’s life, 
physical integrity and health. Besides, at labour law compensation the actual 
existence of the legal relationship is a conceptual element, namely, labour re­
lationship must exist between the parties, otherwise the norms of the Labour 
Code cannot be applied, namely, if  an infringement is committed after the 
labour relationship, the authorised person can present claim according to the 
rules of the civil law.
In labour actions the non-material infringements are judged somewhat 
differently. These judgments are parallel to the general civil law judgments 
in the sense that the employee’s accident or physical damage establishes the 
claim for non-material infringement. At the same time in labour law judg­
ments the courts interpret the personal damages narrower, so in the examined 
period we have not found such judgments which would have settled the non­
material infringement as a consequence of e.g. illegal termination in spite of 
the fact that in principle it is not unprecedented in the judicial practice.64 
On the basis of this data we think that the employees typically claim for 
non-material infringement because of occupational accident or deteriorating 
health and other (e.g. the hum iliating treatment from the employer’s part, 
stress, etc.) damages appear in smaller proportion.
The possible interpretation o f the grievance fee in 
connection o f the protection o f personal rights in labour law
The present Labour Code in force does not even include the concept of non­
material compensation, and in contrast with the Labour Code of 1992 in the 
circle of the liab ility for damages there is no reference to the employer’s obli­
gation to compensate the employee’s infringement of which she/he suffered 
as a consequence of tort affected not her/his property but her/his personality 
(non-material infringement). So at first sight it is not quite clear whether the 
legislator’s intention was that regarding the employment relationships the 
non-material damage would not belong to the damages that should be com­
pensated, but it can be read from the minister’s reasoning of the bill that since
63 G. Nadas, A munkabalesetekkel kapcsolatos kdrfelelossegproblematikdja, Miskolc 2004, p. 22.
64 See for example: EBH 2002/790, MfV.I.10.711/2006/4, Curia of Hungary.
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the Labour Code refers to the Civil Code in this respect, too,65 on the basis 
of the 355. § (4) of the Civil Code the aggrieved party’s non-material damage 
must be compensated, too, namely, in this respect the tortfeasor is obliged to 
make compensation like in the case of property damage. Generally, it is true 
that the same rules refer to the compensation of the non-material damage 
but there can be differences from the compensation of the material damage as 
a consequence of its nature. Therefore, the 355. § (1) declares the main rule, 
namely, if  the restoration of the original state -  in integrum restitutio -  is not 
possible, or the aggrieved party does not demand it because of a good cause, 
the tortfeasor is obliged to compensate both the material and non-material 
damage in order to avoid the consequences of the damage.
This way the Labour Code according to the established dogmatics of the 
liab ility in the civil law -  referring to the Chapter XXXI of the Civil Code 
-  disposes of the non-material damage as one form of damages within the 
frames of compensation law. In contrast, the change as a consequence of the 
new Civil Code disposes to apply the relevant rules of the new Civil Code 
in case of the damage of the personal rights, in fact the obligation to com­
pensate the damage in personal right is put to the level of basic law and in 
our opinion, if  this approach will receive enough emphasis in the future legal 
application, will improve the more effective protection of the personal rights 
anyway, what is of high importance in the employment relationship.66 Dog­
matically, this solution is noteworthy anyway, though the new Civil Code 
disposes to apply the general rules of liability for damage, but it may raise the 
question whether it is expedient quasi to take out the special legal institution 
of non-material compensation from the compensation law and to highlight 
its function less emphasizing its compensation feature in the classical sense.
In connection with the rules of personal protection of the Labour Code 
it must be emphasized that in most of the cases the judicial practice does not 
examine carefully enough the occurrence and measure of the non-material 
damage, and on judging the amount of compensation it does not balance 
carefully enough. We think that in this respect it is correct to make closer 
relationship with the protection of personal rights, since this way the tortfea­
sor can be obliged to compensate the non-material damage on the basis of 
certain relevant statutory provisions. At the same time it must be noted that 
because of the special legal feature of the non-material damage the judicature 
is often in a difficult position when tries to judge „correct” or at least equi­
table in such cases. It is necessary to add that the protection of personal rights
65 Bill No. T/4786. Act on the Labour Code, 177. §.
66 T. Gyulavari (ed.), M unkajog.. . , p. 85-88.
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in the Labour Code -  in it the amended rules can show directions -  can be 
divided into general and special spheres in a special way, since besides the ap­
plication of the relevant parts of the new Civil Code, the further rules of the 
9. § of the Labour Code contains such norms which definitely come from 
the specialities of the employment relationship mentioned above. Namely, if  
we take base either the general damage of the personal rights or the definite 
labour law cases -  let’s th ink of the excessively arbitrary restriction of the 
personal rights -  it is progressive from the legislator’s part that he intends 
to organize the legal consequences unitedly ensuring that the non-material 
damage should be compensated -  henceforward partly w ithin the frames of 
the judicial discretion.
It is important to note that the new rules can bring more united aspect 
and approach to the field of the labour law protection of the personal rights, 
though it is true in general that the protection of personality is mostly enti­
tled for the employee, but in fact the Labour Code provisions the application 
of the new Civil Code for both the employer and the employee, so this legal 
construction can improve the aim of the statutory instrument according to 
which the parties’ legal status would be -  even if  not equal but -  at least closer 
to each other. All these have important role in the protection of economic 
and social interests and in this respect it should be noted that according to 
the legislator’s intention the rules of the non-material compensation would 
be more united and effective, and in connection with the grievance fee even 
simpler in the long run.
Final consideration -  the expected effects o f the grievance 
fee in labour law
The application of grievance fee may have significant importance on the 
labour law judging practice referring to the amended conceptual system. It 
must be emphasized that the regulation itself and its grounds are not enough 
to answer the emerged questions, since it is a great task for the Hungarian 
judicature. It is clear from the previous legal practice that the institution of 
the non-material compensation -  independently from its current regulation 
method -  is a practical legal institution, and both the advantages and disad­
vantages of this thesis appear in such judgments. Basically, the courts manage 
the legal questions of the non-material compensation flexible, and this in 
many cases leads to the actual assessment of the damage and the appropri­
ate compensation. However, in some cases the courts can hardly establish 
the non-material damage and m ainly the amount because of its special legal
8 8 PETER SIPKA, MARTON LEÓ ZACCARIA
nature. Though referring to the rules of the new Civil Code the Labour Code 
will be changed in a special way but we think that the result of the correct and 
evolutionary legal interpretation will be a legal interpretation of non-material 
damage which will be well-founded but flexible enough. Its main function 
will be that the infringed person should receive effective legal remedy by the 
grievance fee. Finally, attention should be paid to the fact that the clear and 
united civil law rules can make the ruling easier in labour law cases. However, 
the fundamental differentiating specific nature of labour law which separates 
it from the civil law must not be left without attention, referring to the social 
function of the labour law regulation and the conceptual differences that still 
exist.
A bstrakt
Opracowanie omawia jedną z nowych instytucji prawnych w węgierskim prawie cywil­
nym i prawie pracy, zadośćuczynienie za szkody niemajątkowe. Funkcją tej instytucji 
prawnej jest ochrona podmiotów prawnych i zadośćuczynienie za poniesione szkody 
niematerialne. Pojęcie szkody niemajątkowej zostało omówione zarówno w ujęciu teo­
retycznym, jak i praktycznym. Autorzy przedstawili swoje wnioski dotyczące funkcji 
zadośćuczynienia za szkody niemajątkowe w prawie pracy, uwzględniając szczególne 
zasady praw osobistych pracowników.
Słowa kluczowe: prawo cywilne, prawo pracy, odszkodowanie niepieniężne, prawa 
osobiste, odpowiedzialność deliktowa
